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CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION AS NORM CREATION
Eric Millard
Université Paris Nanterre, France
Introduction: constitutional interpretation is not a scientific interpretation of a text or texts, known as the constitution.
Constitutional interpretation is a norm-creation process; it is a process that establishes the constitution as a norm. Before
interpretation occurs, there is no norm and, therefore, there is no constitution. Moreover, this means that interpreters can
create constitution as a meaning, as a valid source, as well as they create the hiererchy of norms deriving from the
constitution. This paper confronts three appraoches of that topic, namely formalistic (constitutionalism), apparently
antiformalistic (neo-constitutionalism) and truly antiformalistic (realism). It discusses the political issue whether what is
the most adequate theory if man wants to guarantee democracy and human rights and analyses judicial activism from this
perspective. It demonstrates that, using the so-called “reasonable” reasoning grounded in democratic legitimacy, a court
created by a constitution can decide not only what constitutional powers can achieve within the constitution, but also
what powers (including powers that were formally democratically elected) shall do to enact a new constitution. That is to
create a clause of eternity of the valid constitution, inconsistent with any conception of democracy.
Key words: constitutional interpretation, meaning of legal rules, norm creation, judicial freedom, neorealism,
neo-constitutionalism.
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КОНСТИТУЦИОННОЕ ТОЛКОВАНИЕ КАК НОРМОТВОРЧЕСТВО
Эрик Миллард
Университет Западный Париж (Франция)
Введение. Толкование конституции не является научной интерпретацией текста или текстов, известных
как конституция. Толкование конституции – это нормотворческий процесс; процесс, который учреждает
конституцию как норму. До интерпретации не существует нормы и, соответственно, конституции. Более
того, это означает, что толкователи могут создавать конституцию как смысл, как имеющий юридическую
силу источник, также как они создают иерархию норм, вытекающих из конституции. В данной научной статье
сравниваются три подхода к этой проблематике, а именно формалистический (конституционализм), условно
антиформалистический (неоконституционализм) и истинно антиформалистический (реализм). Обсуждает-
ся политический вопрос о том, какая теория обеспечивает наибольшие гарантии демократии и прав челове-
ка, и анализируется судебный активизм с этой точки зрения. В статье доказывается, что, используя так назы-
ваемую «разумную» аргументацию, основанную на демократической легитимности, суд, учрежденный
конституцией, может решать не только вопрос о полномочиях конституционных органов власти в рамках
конституции, но и о том, что им (в том числе официально избранным демократическим путем) необходимо
сделать для принятия новой конституции – установить положение о вневременном существовании действу-
ющей конституции, несовместимое с любым представлением о демократии.
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1 – It is generally accepted that people who
believe in fundamental values, such as democracy,
the rule of law or human rights, should also have
confidence in a written constitution or in a
constitutional court. The first approach rests in
classical formalism, which perceives the
constitution as a text that binds all authorities
which are constituted by it. The second school of
thought draws on the idea that the strong values
in which we believe are more important than the
text of a constitution, and that, using reason,
judges, can decide what constitutes a good
constitution as our highest norm.
It therefore seems that we are now far
removed from the bad nightmare that annoyed
Hart for instance [4; 5; 8]. Or, using the scientific
method, we can understand what constitutes a
constitutional norm by reading the constitution. Or,
this knowledge is not important because we can
trust judges to use moral reasoning to interpret
the constitutional text. Even if we consider the
most complex and persuasive theories relating to
these questions, such as Kelsenian normativism
for formalism [7] or Atienza’s or Alexy’s versions
of what is now known in Latin countries as neo-
constitutionalism [1–3; 9; 10], we have to choose
between two noble dreams. The nightmare has
disappeared.
2 – For many reasons, I do not feel
comfortable with these two available choices.
Certainly the main concern arises from the defence
of values, such as democracy or so-called human
rights. The available choices are not practical
mechanisms for effectively implementing these
values. There is no necessary contradiction
between these two conceptions in the ethical
position; it depends on metaethics. On the other
hand, there is no necessary link between a liberal
position in ethics and neo-constitutionalism. In fact,
there is likely an existing contradiction. Why do I
have to trust a judge, and even if I do, how is this
consistent with the idea of democracy? Why do I
have to ignore Kelsen’s warning that legal
(normative) science can only let us know how a
law ought to be, not how it is? These questions
continue to be important, and I think that these
values, at least for me, are too important to be
confined to theory. I am concerned by the defence
of these values in practice, not in theory. And in
order to defend these values in practice, we need
a theory that does not lead us to misunderstand
what law is and how it functions.
In a democracy, it is important that rules
adopted for and by democracy are effective. But
to state that this is important does not inform our
understanding as to how this point can be effective.
A noble dream, whatever it is, has no utility if you
cannot realize it. You can only realize a dream
when the environment provides the opportunity
for it to take place; our world, material or mental,
does not suit these dreams. But, of course, it is
possible that, even without being effective, these
dreams have some effect on our world, for
instance having a bearing on important topics, such
as legitimacy or persuasion. But they do not
automatically produce the effects they set out,
which are to guarantee human rights and/or
democracy. Of course, to be analytically
consistent we can employ new definitions. For
instance, we can decide that the word democracy
refers not to the decision of the majority of the
voters, but only to what these voters decide
according to certain values, and even maybe to
the values that they have to decide (and if so is it
still necessary to maintain the participation of the
voters if there is nothing more to decide?); or that
unjust law is not law. But once we have provided
new definitions, we rest in peace with our theories,
but totally disconnected from the most obvious
and numerous states of affairs in our world.
Definitions are free, and our concepts are mostly
stipulated; but changing a definition or a concept
does not erase the existing state of affairs; it just
changes the title we use to refer to it.
My concern is not law and constitutional
interpretation as they should be, but rather what
happens when constitutional interpretation takes
place - that is, what effects are produced as a
consequence of constitutional interpretation by
courts and other legal bodies. I believe that
understanding and accepting constitutional
interpretation is a major issue for those who really
want to support democracy and human rights. But
I do not believe it will help to reconstruct it as a
noble dream, which we cannot attain. Nor will it
help redefine democracy and human rights to the
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ends of theoretical consistency or stick to an
idealist conception of the law.
3 – From this point of view, things appear
very differently: constitutional interpretation does
not refer to a scientific interpretation of a text or
a set of texts called “the constitution”.
Constitutional interpretation is a norm-creation
process, one which creates the constitution as a
norm. Before interpretation, no norm exists; in
other words, there is no constitution. And we can
never be sure that this norm creation will become
an interpretation of a text or set of texts known
as the constitution, and we cannot be sure that
this norm creation process is or will be reasonable,
and will support democracy, human rights, or
justice. I do not think we are finished with the
nightmare; and, perhaps, this is not a nightmare,
but in fact our real life.
This approach, known as legal realism, is
not a new one and is, in fact, one of the most
known and discussed approaches. Legal realism
symbolizes the bad dream for anyone who believes
in any form of formalism, or reason in an absolute
sense. But legal realism is a form of scepticism.
And I suspect that it is scepticism which is not
accepted by the so-called neo-constitutionalism:
according to neo-constitutionalism, reason can
protect us from judges’ discretion, because
judges, guided by reason, will know what
constitutes a true or correct constitution and a
true or correct norm.
The anti-formalism of an approach such as
neo-constitutionalism is only apparent. This
approach is as formalist as any other approach
that pretends that we are able to know what a
norm is, except that we know not from the text,
but from Reason (something even more abstract
than a text). The reconstruction of anti-formalism
as a noble dream is only possible through the
affirmation of non-posit ivistic normative
knowledge: a modern form of natural law.
4 – On the other hand, legal realism is a
very confusing concept. It is usually used in legal
theory to indicate that we have a conception of
the law as part of reality. Law is not just an idea.
But what does it mean? Does it mean that
law really exists? Or that we can call law only
what we can observe, that which exists? Or does
it mean something else? Of course, a good
strategy would be to say that realism is a theory
designed by those known as legal realists. But
who are they, and do they have a theory, or a
specific theory?
For many people, legal realists do have a
theory, which simply states that courts do not
apply (formal) law, but rather decide according
to their individual preferences. And, the reasons
for their decisions are undecidable, legal or not.
But in that sense, legal realism is just a description.
Logically, it does not imply that judges do not
decide according to (formal) law. The theory
should logically accept that judges can be formal,
and can decide in a formalistic way. If they are
formal. And maybe are they, if not truly, at least
mainly. That is just a contingent issue and this
issue depends on mere facts: what are doing
courts.
On the other hand, regardless of whether
judges ignore the formally conceived law or not,
what they do should always be considered the
empirically conceived law. I conceive of the law
as being based on judges’ rulings: what I call law
is what judges make [6]. The role of formalism in
a such approach is not to establish whether judges
ought to decide according to formal law, but to
establish that they can decide the law, according
to a formal interpretation of a text, or reasoning,
or whatever else. A statement, in its last part, that
even Kelsen should accept as far as it refers to
what judges really do in practice, not what they
should do. But maybe not the part of neo-
constitutionalism which supports judicial activism.
Judicial decisions, obviously, appear to
always be grounded in law: based on precedents
or texts. Realists state that this is only an
appearance: strategically or not, it gives the
impression that decisions are formally derived
from previous legal materials, and not the
expression of individual preferences. These
decisions are not discretions and they are not
creations. But for realists, the facts are different.
Formal or not (and because they can be formal
or informal), judges always decide with discretion
and, thus, create law. And this is the precondition
for trusting judges, who are guided by reason, but
it is not a guarantee that the outcome will be
reasonable, as far as we can determine what is
reasonable.
From this point of view, realism leads to two
different approaches: American realism and the
so-called Scandinavian realism. I do not intend to
explore here what they are, but will just stress
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certain differences in relation to the idea of
constitutional interpretation as a norm creation
process.
5 – Initially, American legal realism was
conceived as a mood, a non-theoretical approach
to law. It was conceived as a tool box, which
anyone could adopt freely according to their own
premises. American legal realism was more of a
practical approach than an epistemological one.
And that is probably the reason for its success in
the US and its extensive influence there and in
other countries. It remains a descriptive approach,
but it very quickly surpassed description (theory)
and appealed to other things, that only pre-
deconstruction and description of facts allowed.
This movement to deconstruct the law
allowed for various reconstructions, grounded in
the idea that law in general, and constitutional
norms in particular, serve as the forum for political
confrontation, and that interpretation, foremost
constitutional interpretation, is a political choice
between opposing political views. Furthermore,
the constant confrontation with a more formalistic
approach derives less from a confrontation
between two theories of legal knowledge, and
more from the confrontation between two
conceptions of legitimacy - between two political
doctrines of legitimacy, notably the legitimacy of
what comprises a constitution.
The phrase “creating a norm” is, therefore,
a vague statement, which suggests that a norm is
a product of a judge’s work that has been
grounded in various elements, including the political
element (and including it maybe as the most
important). Formalism supports the idea that a
constitution is a political pact or consensus that
cannot be changed by interpretation. Realism
supports the one that the constitution has to be
adapted constantly by interpretation, according to
our world evolution.
There is no question about what a norm is,
or how we conceptualise norm. Or the text has
to be applied, or the court should decide the norm.
6 – The so-called Scandinavian realism,
which these days is no longer considered
Scandinavian, on the contrary, derives from an
epistemological critical school of though. It is not
a tool box, but rather a theory that sets out to be
consistent. A theory of cognition: how can we
assert that we know what law is? The four main
theses supported by this theory are as follows:
a) There is a distinction between science
and its object; in this case, the distinction is between
legal science and law.
b) A scientific process is seen as politically
neutral, that is, the law is not identified as it should
be but as it is.
c) Science describes its object as an
objective reality, that is the law of legal science
must be reduced to a reality, something that exists.
d) Reality is a set of facts but a set of mere
facts: legal science must be an empirical science,
which describes facts and this sometimes leads
to the idea of a test of verification.
This Scandinavian theory of realism can
easily share with American legal realism the idea
that norms, if law is a set of norms, are created
by judges. When a judge state that this is Law,
we have a social fact (the fact of stating : linguistic
entities). And asserting that what judges say is
law allows, when it’s interpreted as a prediction
of what judges will say, a test to verify that it is
true, in a scientific sense, that this the law.
But, on the other hand, this theory must
explain a bit further its concept of a norm - why it
should be considered consistent to perceive
interpretation as a norm creation activity.
American legal realism can avoid this treatment
for two reasons: it does not intend to be a theory
and it does not intend to (only) describe reality,
but rather act on it. In other words, it does not
describe interpretation, but rather proposes,
supports, criticizes or imposes (fair) interpretations.
That does not mean that American realism ignores
these questions, but providing an answer is not a
necessity, as it is in Scandinavian realism.
7 – So when we state that constitutional
interpretation is a norm creation process, we need
to provide precise definitions for all relevant
concepts in that statement: constitution,
constitutional interpretation, norm, and norm
creation.
a) We have many conceptions of a
constitution. Most of them are not legal conceptions.
For instance, we use the word constitution to
designate a political program, a national pact, a
moral document, etc. These conceptions are
plausible, and it is a fact that, historically,
constitutions fit these conceptualisations (some
continue to do so even to this day).
In legal thought, constitution is seen as a
norm, as far as we accept the idea that law is
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made of norms. But not all documents known as
constitutions are norms, and not all constitutional
norms are texts or something based on texts. On
the other hand, all texts known as constitutions
do not have a sole normative function. For these
reasons, constitutional interpretation is important:
we need norms, and we sometimes, but not
always, have texts that do not intend or do not
solely intend to be normative. Constitutions as texts
are not designed (only) by and for jurists.
b) Norms. If we abandon the source of the
noblest dream - the weak idea that we do not need
interpretation because constitutional texts are clear,
endowed with a sole normative function and a sole
meaning - we can usually define a norm as a
prescriptive meaning. A prescriptive meaning of a
text, or just a prescriptive meaning (disconnected
formally or substantially from any text).
A constitutional norm is therefore the prescriptive
meaning of a constitutional value.
Of course not all constitutional meanings are
valid, but that is another point, much more
complicated: constitution as a norm is a meaning
of a certain (constitutional) value. Here, I only
look at the concept of a norm, or more precisely
concepts of norm. Indeed, we can have two
conceptions of a norm as a prescriptive meaning.
First, we can use an ideal conceptualisation,
in which a norm is an acceptable meaning
according to certain points of view. When using a
scientific approach, such as the one adopted by
Scandinavian realism, these points of view are
strictly connected with the linguistic analysis of
texts, rather than with political preferences of the
interpreters of the text. But a linguistic analysis
of a text rarely provides us with a singular
meaning. We can only determine a framework of
more or less broad meanings, whereby we can
only distinguish between several meanings that
can be considered correct and some that are not
considered correct. It is well known that this kind
of activity is not perceived as norm creation
activity, but rather as knowledge activity. On the
other hand, this kind of activity does not offer a
solution to someone who has to decide a case
according to the law: even a formalist judge would
have to decide within a framework what is the
(valid or effective) norm; and, in turn, the judge
could decide the (valid or effective) norm as
something that is not correct according
framework.
So we also need an expressive conceptualisation
of a norm: a meaning that has been in fact adopted
by certain authorities under certain circumstances.
And for an empirical conception of legal science,
this norm is a valid (effective) norm, this norm
exists and can be described as law as it is. And
only this norm. It doesn’t matter if it is an explicit
norm (it is a correct meaning according to linguistic
analysis) or an implicit one (it is an incorrect
meaning according to linguistic analysis or it is a
meaning disconnected from any text according
to linguistic analysis).
c) Constitutional interpretation is therefore
a process which provides us with (valid or
effective) constitutional norms. In other words,
constitutional interpretation offers constitutional
prescriptive meaning, which jurists refer to. But
there are as many conceptions of constitutional
interpretation as there are conceptions of norms.
First, we can consider constitutional
interpretation as a scientific process designed to
reveal the ideal meanings of a constitution as a
text, held as valid (constitutional sources).
Importantly, we cannot avoid a scientific
interpretation of such texts, if any, because there
is no clear text that can be understood without
scientific (linguistic) methods ; but we cannot
establish here one and only one meaning.
Second, we can consider constitutional
interpretation as a decisive process: the one that
gives or has given constitutional prescriptive
meaning to a text, or maybe constitutional
prescriptive meaning outside a text.
d) Creation norm activity. For the same
reasons as above, we can have two conceptions
of a norm creation process - one strong and the
other weak.
In the weak sense, we can say that any
interpreting body, even a court which sincerely
wants to stick with formalism and respects what
has been written in a constitutional text, has to
decide what meaning is the norm, within a
framework of the text’s possible meanings. No
judge can avoid making a decision, but if he
decides within the framework, the norm creation
process is not the outcome of the sole judge’s
decision. The norm creation process includes
constitutional power, which adopted the text, and
the interpreting body which selects one possible
meaning for the text from a linguistic point of view.
Most constitutions offer vague texts, allowing the
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interpreter’s choice to be broad (and the vaguer
it is, the broader is the choice). Of course, the
interpretation of the constitution as having one
meaning is a political phenomenon, as it expresses
the personal preferences and emotions of the
person who interprets the constitution. Even from
a formalist  or idealist point of view, the
interpretation of a constitution as a text in practice
is partially political, and all those who interpret it
take part in the norm creation process. This kind
of process is may be desirable, and it is also
possible; but there is no guarantee that the
interpreting bodies limit themselves to this process.
So, applying the strong conceptualisation, we
can say that the enacting authority only provides
a text - one of the sources of law (official, if not
real) - but never provides a norm (that is the
element of law, not the source). As a
consequence, we never know how effective (real)
this (official) source will be. Sole the norm decided
by an interpret in a case is law, and the only person
who has norm creation power is the interpreter.
This role is primarily performed by courts, but
other bodies, such as the executive administration,
or constitutional authorities can also take on that
role. If we adopt this point of view, we do not
need to know if the norm meaning is chosen
within or from outside a given framework, even
if such knowledge would help develop typologies
to the ends of understanding how much weight is
given to the text and how much to its interpreter.
But each choice is a pure decision, and all choices
are expressions of complete power over the
decision of what constitutes a norm, even within
the framework. Norm creation is the sole power
of the interpreters.
When realists say that constitutional
interpretation is a norm creation process, they can
refer to either the weak or the strong conception.
In any case, if they are truly realists, in that they
base their assumptions on facts, they assume that
constitutional interpretation is always a norm
creation process, just because there is no
constitutional norm before interpretation.
Constitutional interpretation creates all implicit
norms, and all explicit norms, even if in the latter
case man can say that this creation is not the result
of the sole interpretation, and in the first that this is
not interpretation, but pure autonomous creation.
8 – It is true that we can find facts that
allow such a conception. But if we want to go a
bit further, we should pay a little more attention to
something else. What are we saying exactly when
we say that constitutional interpretation creates a
constitution? Obviously, we imply that this process
creates a constitutional norm. But, in what sense?
We can distinguish at least four meanings:
a) First, constitutional interpretation
establishes which prescriptive meaning counts for
constitution. This is the most common meaning
and I will not expand further on it.
b) Second, sometimes a text, which is or is
not called a constitution, is an official, or legitimate,
source of law. In this instance, constitutional
interpretation creates not only the norm, but also
the source of the norm. Or, if we prefer,
constitutional interpretation establishes which text
is to be considered the source of the constitutional
norm. This is the condition for an explicit norm.
c) Third, there is a prescriptive meaning that
counts as constitution without any text as its
source. This presents the possibility of an implicit
norm.
d) And fourth, some texts that  are
considered as sources of law, but are not
constitutional law, are now considered as official,
or legitimate, sources of constitutional law. This
is known as the creation of normative hierarchy.
Let me offer some examples to illustrate the
latter three meanings.
In the US, the admission of judicial review
in Marbury vs Madison is certainly the most
obvious example of the second meaning –
assigning the text the status of a source of law.
Chief Justice Marshall was the first to establish
the US constitution as a source of law, providing
an interpretation of a text known as the
“constitution”. This was certainly not the most
obvious possible way of understanding the text,
which transformed a political pact into a legal
source. And it was the precondition for the
decision of the prescriptive meaning of that legal
source: the constitution as a norm.
In Israel, Justice Barak did the same, but in
a context without any constitutional text. This is
the third meaning of the norm creation process.
In 1995, in the case of the United Misrahi Bank,
an Israeli court limited Knesset’s power to adopt
a statute, while there was no enacted text
counting as a constitutional source, which could
be used as a starting point for imposing power
limitations on parliament. In other words, the
14
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constitution had to be established as a norm in the
absence of a constitution as a source.
And, finally, in France, we can find
illustrations of the fourth meaning: the changing
of the hierarchical status of an official source of
law or the creation of the hierarchy of sources.
In 1971, the Conseil Constitutionnel decided that
some fundamental principles included in
republican legislative statutes were part of the
constitution and could not be modified by another
legislative statute. In this instance, a French court
interpreted the preamble of the constitution,
referring to the “Principes fondamentaux
reconnus par les Lois de la République” firstly as
a normative statement (exactly as Justice Marshall
did in the first example), and secondly as a
statement allowing the court to decide using judicial
review what counts as a legislative provision and
what counts as a constitutional source in statutes
previously adopted by parliament. Of course, the
same court will have to decide what, in these
statutes, is a principle of constitutional value, and
what is the meaning of this principle.
As we can see, interpreters, who in this
instance mainly comprise constitutional courts,
create constitutions in all possible senses of the
word as is prescribed in legal philosophy.
Interpreters can establish the sources of
constitutional law; they can decide the hierarchy
of law sources; they can decide the prescriptive
meaning of the constitution, regardless of whether
it is derived from a written source or not.
Constitutional interpretation, which is the name
usually given in legal philosophy to that kind of
activities of constitutional courts, even if it’s not
interpretation strictly, or if it not what courts should
do, goes beyond the formalist idea of an a priori
knowledge of a text.
9 – If we now come back to neo-
constitutionalism and judicial activism, we can see
that we need an important dose of optimism in
order to have confidence in courts and in their
reasonable reasoning to protect human rights or
democracy.
It is a contingent problem, not a necessary
connection, between court decisions and political
quality of norms. When we support judicial
activism because a certain court decides in a
certain manner, we often forget that a different
court could have decided differently, in a way
which we potentially would not support politically.
Examples drawn from Latin American
experiences illustrate this. In Colombia, for
instance, the judicial activism of the constitutional
court is narrowly connected to the country’s
political situation and the weakness of parliament.
This allows the court to act and to appear as
having legitimacy to act. Judicial activism in this
case implies a living conception of the constitution
as a political document. On the other hand, a norm
creation process is usually seen as a constraint: it
is embodied in decisions with formal
argumentation, through a justification of the
decision, whatever that justification is.
For strategic or just pragmatic reasons,
decisions and justifications are often disconnected
from each other in the Colombian experience. For
instance, the court can make decisions through
press communiqués, which become effective
immediately (accion de tutela), and then delay
for months or years the formal publication of the
statement, which outlines the justifications. And
it’s not rare that the statement, whilst addressing
the political or doctrinal reactions to the decision,
is modified in a way that does not always appear
to provide logical reasons for the previous and
effective decision. At that point, the court does
not really create a norm; it decides without any
norm in any sense.
We may support the decision politically, as,
most of those decisions really support values that
we call human rights. But a different court (with
different members, who have different
preferences) could decide differently, and we
would have no useful constraints of argumentation
limiting their power.
With the statement called juizio de
substitucion, the court shows the real nature of
judicial activism. The court decided whether there
is a difference between amending the constitution
and adopting a new one. Therefore,  the
amendment of the constitution could only be done
through the process established by the constitution
and it falls under the powers of this court to control
that process, according to its rфle of protection
given by the constitution: a procedural
constitutionally grounded control. But the same
also decided to control the process to enact a new
constitution: to perform a political, but not
constitutionally grounded control.
Logically, if a court exists according to a
certain constitution and controls all attempts to
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amend this constitution, the process of enacting a
new constitution, by definition, is disconnected
from the previous constitution. In other words,
the distinction established by the court between
amending and enacting a new constitution implies
that enacting a new constitution does not fall under
its competence. The first argument used by the
court to deny that difference was to refuse to
interpret the reform as an amendment : the
enacting process was not valid in the first instance
according to the enacted constitution because it
amended a crucial part of that enacted
constitution, and thus cannot be seen as an
amendment, but rather as a process to change
the whole constitution. The second argument used
by the court was that the enacting process, when
interpreting the same reform as an enactment of
a new constitution, was not democratic enough
to be perceived as a legitimate means to change
the whole constitution (to enact a  new
constitution). These two arguments may seduce
from a political point of view (even if in the case
of Colombia, courts changed their political position
about the issue: changing the process and
possibility of re-electing the President). But from
a logical point of view, it shows only that a court
created by a constitution can estimate, through a
so-called reasonable reasoning grounded in
democratic legitimacy, not only what constitutional
powers can do within the constitution, but also
what powers are required to enact a new
constitution (outside any constitution). That is to
create a clause of eternity of the valid enacted
constitution: an implicit constitutional norm created
by the sole court, that includes a sole possibility
of derogation under the conditions of its
appreciation (its authorization) by the Court,
according to its appreciation of legitimacy.
I am not here to complain about or support
this point. I just want to demonstrate to what judicial
activism can be applied, as well as show what it
means and implies.
10 – Neo-constitutionalism is not a new
version of constitutionalism; it is something entirely
different, as it does not perceive the constitution
as a political or legal text that is able to guarantee
liberalism. Neo-constitutionalism places its trust
in constitutional courts.
It is possible that neither constitutionalism
nor neo-constitutionalism can provide strong,
definitive and efficacious guarantees.
Constitutions can be changed or not respected,
as accepted by constitutionalism, while courts can
decide anything for any reason. Stating this, of
course, does not provide us with practical
solutions. But to deny it is no more efficacious.
At least, a sceptical position addresses the
fact that we have a problem, a position not taken
by the neo-constitutionalist school of thought.
Noble dreams are good for those who sleep.
Nightmares have at least one virtue: they awake
us and open our eyes. It is very possible that the
defence of values, such as democracy and human
rights need, much more than law, or whatever
we call law.
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